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ABSTRACT 
Individuals with social anxiety often report considerable ruminative thoughts following 
ambiguous social events (post-event processing). The purpose of this study was to 
determine whether post-event processing affects the retrieval of autobiographical 
memories rated as negative, anxious and shameful in a sample of socially anxious 
individuals and controls. The results indicated that, compared to controls, socially 
anxious individuals recalled memories that were rated as significantly more negative 
and shameful regardless of the type of post-event processing engaged in. 
Unexpectedly, after negative post-event processing socially anxious individuals 
recalled memories that although anxious and shameful, were rated as significantly 
more calming than after other types of post-event processing. The results imply that 
post-event processing may have some adaptive benefit that could explain why it 
persists in socially anxious individuals. 
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POST-EVENT PROCESSING AND THE RETRIEVAL OF 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES IN SOCIALLY ANXIOUS 
INDIVIDUALS 
Clark and Wells’ (1995) model of social phobia suggests that on the basis of early 
experiences social phobics develop a set of assumptions about themselves and social 
situations that affect the way in which they interpret future social encounters. Before 
social encounters, social phobics engage in a pre-mortem, in which they review in 
detail the possible outcomes of a social interaction prior to entering it. This pre-
mortem is dominated by recollections of past failures, negative images of the self, and 
predictions of poor performance and rejection and leads to a negative processing state 
during the ensuing social situation. This negative processing state encompasses 
various activities that prevent the person from disconfirming their negative beliefs 
about the threat of the situation. Socially anxious individuals shift their attentional 
focus towards detailed monitoring and observation of themselves as a social object—
neglecting external information (see Hofmann, 2000; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000; Wells 
& Papageorgiou, 1998). This tends to make them aware of the somatic and cognitive 
symptoms triggered by the perception of threat (e.g. blushing, trembling, increased 
heart rate, mental blanks, lack of concentration, palpitations), which in turn are taken 
as further evidence of threat and create further anxiety (see Wells & Papageorgiou, 
2001; Roth, Antony & Swinson, 2001). Furthermore, social phobics use in-situation 
safety behaviors as coping strategies to reduce the risk of negative evaluation by 
others (see Wells et al., 1995). These behaviors are usually counterproductive (for 
example, a socially anxious person may appear to be unfriendly because they are 
avoiding eye contact). Following the social situation, the social phobic engages in a 
post-mortem during which they review the social event in detail and think about the 
many ambiguous signs of social-acceptance—this is known as post-event processing. 
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Typically they become pre-occupied with anxious feelings and negative self-
perceptions and the ambiguous information is re-interpreted as negative (see Stopa & 
Clark, 2000), leading to greater levels of anxiety and shame (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
Although a significant association between post-event processing and social anxiety 
has been found (Rachman, Gruter-Andrew and Shafran, 2000), little is known about 
the function of post-event processing. Despite efforts to resist thinking about past 
events, socially anxious people have reported a difficulty in attempts to forget or 
suppress information (Fehm & Margraf, 2002) and so rather than viewing post-event 
processing as a way of working through and resolving uncertainties about how one 
appears to others during a social interaction, Rachman et al. suggest that post-event 
processing can worsen these uncertainties, perpetuating social anxiety. However, 
post-event processing has many similarities to the process of rumination, defined by 
Martin and Tesser (1996) as conscious thoughts revolving around a common 
instrumental theme that recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands. 
The function of rumination might, therefore, provide clues to the function of post-
event processing. 
Martin and Tesser (1996) believe that rumination serves to reduce discrepancy in 
goal-attainment. Social phobia is characterized by excessively high standards in social 
performance; because these standards will invariably not be achieved, discrepancy in 
goal-attainment and the ensuing rumination is inevitable. However, it may not be a 
maladaptive process: Martin and Tesser (1989) emphasize that ruminative thought is 
an attempt to find alternative means of reaching unattained goals or in reconciling 
oneself for not reaching these goals. However, failure to resolve the ruminative 
thinking process can be maladaptive: it can increase anxiety (see Field, 2001, Davey, 
1995) and eventually lead to learned helplessness, characterized by a loss of control 
and feelings of powerlessness (Martin and Tesser, 1989). 
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The link between ruminative thought and memory recall may offer an explanation as 
to why rumination increases anxiety. Lyubomirsky, et al. (1998) found that dysphoric 
patients, instructed to ruminate about negative emotions and negative personal 
attributes, spontaneously generated more negative autobiographical memories than 
nondysphoric controls. Interestingly, recent social phobia research has implicated 
memories and imagery as a key maintenance factor for the disorder: Hackmann, Clark 
and McManus, (2000) found that socially anxious individuals repeatedly draw upon 
negative images and memories of adverse social events in recall of anxiety-provoking 
social situations. As such, the socially anxious individual’s distorted image of his/her 
social self may fail to update because of repeated activation of these specific 
memories. Mellings and Alden (2000) have specifically linked post-event processing 
with biased memory recall by suggesting that post-event processing (1) perpetuates 
existing biases through the maintenance of memory traces; (2) could increase the 
salience of negative self-related information, thus maintaining initial biases; and (3) 
could actually aid socially anxious individuals in resolving their concerns. Mellings and 
Alden found that selective attention to negative self-related information led to biases 
in the recollection of a past social interaction and that post-event processing 
contributed to a bias in recall that favors negative self-related information. 
This study aims to further explore the relationship between post-event processing and 
memory recall in social anxiety. In contrast to Mellings and Alden’s study, which 
focused on the frequency of ruminative thoughts as a predictor of encoding negative 
self-related information, the present study attempts to show how ruminative 
responses may lead to a bias in memory recall. It is predicted that socially anxious 
individuals will generate autobiographical memories rated as more negative, shameful 
and anxious after negative post-event processing, compared to non-anxious controls.      
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METHOD 
Participants 
Participants recruited from a higher education college and the University of Sussex 
were initially screened using Turner, Beidel and Dancu’s (1996) Social Phobia and 
Anxiety Inventory (SPAI—see materials section). 132 questionnaires were completed 
and 66 participants were selected from the upper and lower quartiles, 18 males and 
48 females with a mean age of 28 years (SD = 10 years). Participants with SPAI 
scores of 72 or above were selected for the socially anxious group (n = 33) and 
participants with SPAI scores of 44 or below were selected as non-anxious controls (n 
= 33). The mean score on SPAI for the socially anxious group was 87.03 (SD = 
14.29), which is substantially higher than a sample of college students rigorously 
diagnosed by Beidel, Turner, Stanley, and Dacu (1989) as having social phobia (M = 
73.4). The mean score of the socially anxious group also compared to a sample of 121 
social phobics (M = 95, SD = 32.8) reported by Turner et al. (1996). The mean score 
on the SPAI for the non-anxious group was 29.03 (SD = 13.00), which compares to 
the group of college students that Beidel et al. (1989) diagnosed as being non-socially 
anxious (M = 31.3). A t-test confirmed that the socially anxious and non-anxious 
groups scored significantly differently on the SPAI (t(64) = –17.24, p < 0.001).  All 
participants were run individually in a laboratory and were debriefed afterwards.  
Materials 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (Turner, Beidel & Dancu, 1996): The SPAI is a 
45-item self-report questionnaire containing a 7-point Likert response scale, ranging 
from 0 (never) to 6 (always). Peters (2000) found that, compared to other social 
phobia assessment scales, the SPAI is a better measure for discriminating between 
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socially anxious and non-socially anxious participants, and is a significant predictor of 
membership to the social phobia group. 
Mood Questionnaires: The mood questionnaire was used to assess changes in mood 
during the experiment. Each questionnaire asked participants to rate their present 
state on levels of positivity, anxiety and shame. For each of these moods there were 
two visual analogue scales that assessed levels of opposite sides of the emotion on a 
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very). So, for positivity the first scale 
assessed levels of happiness and the second levels of sadness, for anxiety the first 
scale assessed levels of anxiety and the second calmness, for shame the first scale 
assessed shame and the second pride. 
Memory Rating Questionnaire: Participants rated each memory generated in a free 
recall task using a questionnaire similar to that used by Lyubomirsky et al. (1998). 
Participants rated each memory along 6 dimensions of whether it was a positive, 
negative, anxious, calm, shameful or proud experience by endorsing statements with 
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).  
Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000): 
The post-event processing questionnaire (PEPQ) is a 13-item questionnaire 
constructed to measure the extent to which participants engage in a detailed review of 
a socially anxious event. Participants were asked to think of a recent social situation in 
which anxiety was experienced before completing the PEPQ using this situation as the 
example. Respondents answered using a visual analogue scale ranging from 0 (never) 
to 100 (frequently). Rachman et al., (2000) report that scores on this questionnaire 
significantly correlate with social anxiety, although their study did not include data 
from a sub-sample of social phobics.  
8 
Design 
This study was a 2 (social anxiety: socially anxious vs. non-anxious) x 3 (post-event 
processing: negative, positive or distraction task) independent measures design. The 
dependent variables were the self-reported positivity, anxiety and shame of the 
memories recalled after the experiment. The changes in mood and post event 
processing scores were included as predictors in each analysis.  
Procedure 
Pre-Experiment: All participants completed the SPAI pre-experimental assessment two 
weeks prior to participating in the study and were divided into two groups: socially 
anxious individuals and non-anxious controls. Each of these two groups were 
randomly divided into three subgroups for the post-event processing (PEP) conditions 
(negative, positive and distraction task).  
Pre-PEP stage: Participants were asked to read and sign a consent form that described 
the experiment as an investigation into the processes of visual imagery and day-
dreaming. This cover story was given to minimize possible demand characteristics. 
During this pre-PEP stage all participants completed the first mood questionnaire. 
PEP stage: participants were asked to describe a recent ambiguous social event or 
interaction. Participants in the negative PEP condition were then asked to focus their 
attention on negative aspects of the event and why it was a bad experience. 
Participants in the positive PEP condition were instructed to focus their attention on 
positive aspects of the social event and why it was a good experience. Participants in 
the distraction task condition were asked to read an extract of text deemed to have 
little or no emotional content by a small sample of students. The text chosen was 
chapter 3 of Chalmers (1982).  Each group spent 3 minutes engaged in the task to 
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which they were assigned. Participants completed the second mood questionnaire 
directly after PEP. 
Post-PEP stage: participants were given a timed free recall task based on the memory 
task used by Lyubomirsky et al. (1998). Participants were given 3 minutes to recall 
and list several specific events or experiences from memory. No limit was placed on 
the number of memories recalled. Participants were instructed that the memories 
could include recent events or events that had occurred in the past but should not 
include the event described in the response manipulation task. After the free recall 
task, participants rated each of the retrieved memories using the memory rating 
questionnaire described above. Finally, participants completed the PEPQ to measure 
the extent to which they generally negatively ruminate about anxious social events. 
RESULTS 
Scoring Data 
Mood Questionnaires: The six mood scales were reduced to three scores representing 
the three moods that were being assessed. For each mood, the VAS rating on the 
positive aspect of the mood (happy, calm or proud) was subtracted from the VAS 
rating for the negative aspect of the mood (sad, anxious or ashamed) resulting in a 
single score ranging from +100 (very anxious, sad, or shameful) to -100 (very calm, 
happy, or proud). These scores were calculated both before and after the response 
manipulation task and the difference between the two was used as a measure of the 
change in mood across the experimental manipulation. So, for example, a positive 
score for anxiety represented an increase in anxiety over the experiment. 
Memory Ratings: For each memory, indexes of positivity, anxiety and shame were 
created by subtracting the rating on the negative aspect of the emotion (negativity, 
anxious or shame) from the rating for the positive aspect of the emotion (positive, 
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calming or proud). This produced a single score ranging from +4 (very positive, 
calming, or proud) to -4 (very negative, anxious, or shameful). A score of 0, 
therefore, represented a neutral rating in the memory data.   
Mood Ratings 
To check that the results were not due to mood differences between the socially 
anxious and non-anxious groups prior to the experiment, MANOVA was conducted 
using the six self-report mood scales taken at the beginning of the experiment 
(Happy, Sad, Calm, Anxious, Ashamed, Proud) as the dependent variables. This 
revealed no significant difference between groups (V = .093, F(6, 59) = 1.01, ns) 
indicating that self-reported mood between the groups was statistically equivalent 
before post-event processing. Similar results were found when three mood scores 
(described above) were used instead of six. 
Analyses 
The data were analyzed using Multilevel Modeling (see Wright, 1998). Justification for 
using this technique is probably appropriate given that it is still rarely used in 
psychology. In autobiographical memory research, memories are sampled from some 
larger population of memories that a person has. As such the memories that the 
researcher asks a person to recall are nested within the individual. These memories 
could be treated, statistically, as independent units (for example, by taking the 
average rating of several memories as Lyubomirsky et al., 1998, did); however, the 
probability of a given memory being recalled depends on what other memories are 
available, and the recall of one memory may have knock on effects for what other 
memories are recalled. Therefore, memories are not independent units. By treating 
participants as the unit of investigation (rather than memories) the power of the 
analysis is decreased because by aggregating the data important information is 
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ignored (readers unfamiliar with multilevel modeling on memory data will find Wright, 
1998 a useful primer, and Goldstein, 1995; and Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998). 
Multilevel modeling is a technique for analyzing hierarchical data structures. 
Simplistically it can be likened to a multiple regression in which the hierarchical 
structure of the data is accounted for within the analysis. In this case we are 
interested in both the variation among individuals and the variation among memories 
nested within those individuals. Therefore, ratings of each memory are treated as 
random variables within this hierarchy. In its simplest form, the multilevel model is: 
ijjijij eu ++= βRatingMemory  
in which βij is the intercept (like in normal regression), uj is the variation among 
participants and eij is the variation among memories within individuals. The subscript j 
is for people and i is for memories. Terms can then be added to this basic model to 
establish which variables predict the memory ratings. In all of the models described in 
this paper the same predictors were used. First, the type of PEP engaged in was coded 
using two dummy variables (see Field, 2000, chapter 7). The distracter task was used 
as a baseline category and so the first dummy variable (positive PEP) was coded 1 for 
participants who engaged in positive PEP and zero for all other individuals and, 
therefore, represents the difference between positive PEP and distracter task groups. 
The second dummy variable (negative PEP) was coded 1 for participants who engaged 
in negative PEP and zero for all other individuals and, therefore, represents the 
difference between the negative PEP and distracter task groups. Whether an individual 
was socially anxious or not was included as a single dummy variable with non-anxious 
coded as zero and socially anxious coded as 1 (social anxiety). Post even processing 
questionnaire scores were also included as a predictor (pep). Interaction terms 
derived, as in regression, from multiplying terms (see Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan, 1990) 
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were included between whether an individual was socially anxious and the type of PEP 
they engaged in (in terms of the two dummy variables). The final variable entered 
was the change in mood resulting from the task engaged in (be that PEP or 
distraction). In general terms, the model is described as follows: 
ijjj
jj
ijjjjijij
eu ++
++
+++++=
Anxiety Social * PEP Negative
Anxiety Social * PEP PositiveChange Mood
PEPAnxiety SocialPEP NegativePEP PositiveRatingMemory 
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β
ββ
βββββ
  
The model was estimated three different times (once to see which variables predicted 
the positivity ratings of memories and then to look at anxiety and shame ratings 
respectively). The change in mood used was the mood congruent with the type of 
memory rating (so anxious mood was used for anxiety ratings and shameful mood for 
the shame ratings etc.). Estimates were calculated with the program MlwinN 
(Rasbash, Healy, Browne, Cameron, & Charlton, 1999) using restrictive iterative 
generalized least squares, RIGLS (see Goldstein, 1989 for technical details). 
Positivity of Memories  
Figure 1 shows the mean positivity of recalled memories after negative or positive PEP 
or a distraction task in socially anxious and non-anxious individuals. Non-anxious 
individuals recalled more positive memories (as shown by higher scores) regardless of 
the type of post-event processing in which participants engaged. The profile of 
memories recalled across the three different tasks was fairly similar in the socially 
anxious and non-anxious groups1. 
                                       
1 Bear in mind that because Figure 1 displays aggregate data they are fairly crude 
representations of what the multilevel models show, the beta-values in the model are better 
indicators of the correct interpretation of the effects. 
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Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel model for predicting the positivity of a 
given memory. This analysis revealed that social anxiety significantly predicted the 
positivity of the memories. Socially anxious participants produced memories rated as 
significantly less positive. The other main predictor was participants’ scores on the PEP 
questionnaire: as PEP scores increased, the positivity of memories significantly 
decreased. In summary, the multilevel model revealed that socially anxious 
individuals produced significantly less positive memories than non-anxious individuals 
regardless of the task engaged in after generating an ambiguous social event. 
Anxious Memories  
Figure 1 also shows the mean anxiety ratings of recalled memories after negative or 
positive PEP or a distraction task in socially anxious and non-anxious individuals. A 
high score represents a calm memory, and a low score an anxious memory. Socially 
anxious participants appear to generate more anxious memories than controls after 
positive PEP and the distraction task. Oddly though after negative rumination their 
memories were rated as relatively calming. 
Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel model for predicting the anxiety of a given 
memory. As with the positivity of memories, social anxiety significantly predicted the 
anxiety of the memories: socially anxious individuals produced memories rated as 
significantly less calming. Again, the other main predictor of the anxiety of memories 
was the scores on the PEP questionnaires: as PEP scores increased, the calmness 
ratings of memories significantly decreased. Most interesting was the significant social 
anxiety × negative PEP interaction term. This indicated that compared to the 
distraction task, memories were significantly more calming after negative PEP in 
socially anxious individuals compared to non-anxious individuals. In fact, non-anxious 
individuals produced more calming memories after the distraction task than after 
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negative PEP. To sum up, the multilevel model revealed that socially anxious 
individuals generally produced significantly less calming memories than non-anxious 
individuals. However, after negative PEP socially anxious individuals seem to produce 
calming memories (compared to after the distraction task) and in non-anxious 
individuals the reverse trend was observed. 
Shameful Memories  
Figure 1 shows the mean shame ratings of recalled memories after negative or 
positive PEP or a distraction task in socially anxious and non-anxious individuals. A 
high score represents a proud memory, and a low score a shameful memory. Socially 
anxious participants appear to generate more shameful memories than controls 
regardless of the type of post-event processing in which they engaged. 
Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel model for predicting the shame associated 
with a given memory. This model differed from the others in that the interaction 
between social anxiety and PEP score was included as an additional predictor2. As with 
the positivity and anxiety of memories, social anxiety significantly predicted the 
shame associated with the memories: socially anxious individuals produced memories 
rated as significantly more shameful3. There were no other predictors of shame 
                                       
2 This additional term was included because exploratory analysis revealed that for shame 
ratings only, this additional term improved the overall fit of the model. 
3 The β value in table 1 is positive, which implies that socially anxious individuals actually 
produced memories that were rated as less shameful. However, in the full model the direction 
of this effect is moderated by the lower order interaction term of social anxiety × PEP. The true 
main effect of social anxiety can be obtained from a model in which the interaction terms are 
not included. Such a model would take the form of  
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ratings except for the interaction between social anxiety and PEP. To further explore 
this relationship another multilevel model was estimated that looked only at the 
interaction between social anxiety, PEP and the type of PEP engaged in. This model 
took the form: 
ijjj
jijij
eu +++
+=
PEP*PEP Positive*Anxiety Social
PEP*PEP Negative*Anxiety SocialRating Shame
21
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When this model was run, the interaction of social anxiety, positive PEP and PEP 
scores was significant (β = –0.024, SE = 0.009, p = 0.004) as was the interaction of 
social anxiety, negative PEP and PEP scores (β = –0.017, SE = 0.008, p = 0.017). 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of memories against PEP scores for socially anxious 
and non-anxious individuals in the three experimental conditions. This figure shows 
that for non-anxious individuals there is no relationship between PEP scores and 
shame ratings, except after positive PEP where more shameful memories were 
generated in people scoring high on PEP. Socially anxious individuals, as PEP scores 
increase pride ratings increase—regardless of the type of task engaged in. In other 
words, more shameful memories are associated with low PEP scores. To sum up, the 
multilevel models revealed that socially anxious individuals generally produced 
significantly more shameful memories than non-anxious individuals. However, PEP 
seemed to have some influence in socially anxious individuals in that low levels of PEP 
were associated with more shameful memories. 
                                                                                                                              
ijjjijij eu +++= Anxiety SocialRating Shame 10 ββ  
When this model was run, the effect of social anxiety was highly significant (β = –0.839, SE = 
0.352, p = 0.009) and the true direction of the main effect can be seen in the β coefficient: as 
social anxiety increases, ratings decrease (remember low scores = more shame). 
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 DISCUSSION 
This study has four important findings: (1) socially anxious individuals produce 
significantly more negative memories than non-anxious individuals regardless of the 
type of post-event processing engaged in; (2) socially anxious individuals produce 
significantly more anxious memories than non-anxious individuals, except after 
negative post-event processing, after which they produce relatively calming 
memories; (3) socially anxious individuals produce significantly more shameful 
memories than non-anxious individuals regardless of the type of post-event 
processing engaged in, and (4) an individual’s natural tendency to post-event process 
seemed to be associated with more negative and anxious memories in both anxious 
and non-anxious groups but was associated with less shameful memories in socially-
anxious individuals. 
The current findings are consistent with the relationship between post-event 
processing and memory recall bias suggested by Mellings and Alden (2000) who found 
that frequency of post-event processing predicts recall of negative self-related 
information in social phobia. However, whereas Mellings and Alden suggest that this 
relationship reflects a bias in encoding information about a social event, the results of 
the present study suggest there is also a bias in the retrieval of past information: 
post-event processing may lead socially anxious individuals to generate negative 
memories about past events and experiences. However, because similar results have 
been found in dysphoric individuals (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998) one possibility is that 
the socially anxious participants in the current study were more depressed and, 
therefore, the results reflect effects of depression and not social anxiety. However, 
although trait levels of depression were not measured, pre-experiment mood ratings 
were equivalent in socially anxious and non-anxious individuals and the change in 
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mood across post-event processing did not predict differences in memory ratings in 
any analysis; therefore, the observed differences in memories recalled are likely to be 
due to social anxiety and not negative or depressed mood.  
The fact that socially anxious individuals did recall more negative and shameful 
memories than non-anxious individuals fits nicely with Clark and Wells’ conception of 
social phobia. However, one puzzling aspect of this study is that, in terms of positivity 
and shamefulness of memories, the type of PEP engaged in had no effect: regardless 
of whether post-event processing was positive or negative, socially anxious individuals 
drew upon both negative and shameful self-related autobiographical memories. One 
possibility is that positive rumination has no positive effect on the memories recalled. 
This is consistent with Hackmann et al.’s (2000) observation that early unpleasant 
experiences may lead to the development of excessively negative images which fail to 
update even in light of favorable experiences, or positive feedback in a social setting. 
Positive post-event processing may have had no effect in the current study because, 
as Hackmann et al. suggest, positive information is insufficient to update socially 
anxious individuals’ distorted images of their public self. A second explanation is that 
socially anxious individuals were intrinsically incapable of not engaging in negative 
PEP, even when given a distracter task, or asked to engage in dwell on the positive 
aspects of the ambiguous event. Although future work needs to employ thought listing 
techniques to verify post-event processing manipulations, this explanation can 
probably be ruled out by the finding that post-event processing did have differential 
effects on the anxiety ratings of memories. In fact, negative post-event processing led 
to the recall of relatively calmer memories than positive post-event processing or a 
distracter task. This result is a curious one. One explanation is rebound effects, in 
which efforts to avoid a specific thought lead to later preoccupation with that same 
thought (Wegner & Pennebaker, 1992). Perhaps negative PEP led to memories rated 
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as calmer because of a rebound effect of suppressing positive thoughts about an 
event. However, if this were the case then similar rebound effects should be observed 
in terms of the positivity and shame ratings of memories. The ratings might also 
represent mood-congruence and contrast effects (e.g. Burke and Mathews, 1992). 
However, given that mood change did not predict memory ratings in any of the 
analyses, this explanation can probably be ruled out too.  Perhaps then, this result 
tells us something about the adaptive properties of post-event processing. It seems 
that socially anxious individuals will generally recall more negative and shameful 
memories than non-anxious individuals, but that after negative post-event processing 
only, they generate relatively calming memories. Maybe generating calmer memories, 
even though these memories are rated as negative and shameful, is a maintaining 
factor for post-event processing. 
This explanation appears to be consistent with Rachman et al. (2000) who pointed out 
that some of their anxious participants reported that post-event processing actually 
improved matters. Also, these ideas are consistent with the finding that reliving and 
re-appraising traumatic memories is a successful strategy in treatments of disorders 
such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Within these 
treatments patients are encouraged to repeatedly re-visit their memories and 
gradually re-appraise them over successive retrievals. This strategy may work 
because, as Mellings and Alden (2000) have emphasized, prolonged processing of an 
anxiety-provoking social event can help individuals to resolve their concerns (and 
these ideas gel with Martin & Tesser’s, 1989, beliefs about the adaptive function of 
ruminative though in general). Therefore, post-event processing may serve a rather 
similar function to the re-appraisal strategies used in treatments of PTSD: it is used as 
a calming, coping strategy in which anxious memories are revisited and re-appraised. 
Why are the memories calming though? It could be because they represent situations 
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that the individual sees as negative and shameful, but that they have subsequently 
‘come to terms with’ and so now is relatively calming because it is a bad situation that 
they have made good. For example, one participant in the present study reported “I 
remember being teased at school for the color of my hair,” subsequent rating of this 
memory indicated that this participant was drawing on a negative experience but had 
learnt to deal with this experience and, as a result, the memory was rated as calm. As 
such, the current data tentatively suggest that post-event processing could be used as 
a compensatory coping strategy for confronting perceived failures in social situations. 
This could be a small step towards understanding the function of post-event 
processing and explaining why socially anxious individuals engage in this kind of 
thinking after a social interaction. 
The final mystery is the role of trait post-event processing; that is, the degree to 
which individuals naturally engage in post-event processing. Although Rachman et al. 
(2000) have found that scores on their PEPQ correlate highly with social anxiety the 
current study showed that PEPQ scores had an equivalent range in both anxious and 
non-anxious groups. What is more, although levels of natural post-event processing 
generally predicted the recall of more anxious and negative memories (which was 
predicted), in socially anxious individuals levels of natural post-event processing 
predicted the recall of less shameful memories. So, although socially anxious 
individuals generated more shameful memories than non-anxious individuals, those 
that were more prone to post-event processing actually recalled memories about 
which they felt less shame. This finding again tentatively supports an adaptive 
function of post-event processing: the fact that socially anxious people who engage in 
lots of post-event processing are more likely to produce less shameful memories 
suggests that the function of post-event processing may in fact be to make socially 
anxious individuals aware of past failures about which they have come to terms, and 
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to promote less shameful past memories. This is not to say that Clark and Wells are 
incorrect in their beliefs that post-event processing may enhance anxiety about the 
present situation, the current study merely suggests that it promotes recall of specific 
kinds of memories, and that these may be calming, and when the person is prone to 
post-event processing, less shameful too. As such, the current results, like those of 
Rachman et al. (2000), suggest that the focus of the nature and consequences of 
post-event processing in Clark and Wells’ model could perhaps be expanded to 
incorporate the adaptive role that post-event processing may play. 
Of course, one limitation of the preliminary work is that post-event processing may 
not necessarily lead to memory recall in natural situations. The next stage is to 
determine whether participants do naturally recall memories after post-event 
processing. Even if this is not the case, the present study suggests that prompting 
memory recall after post-event processing may have some benefit to socially anxious 
people in that the types of memories they will generate could provide them with cues 
to situations that were negative and shameful, but have a calming property. 
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TABLE CAPTIONS 
 Table 1: Coefficients with their associated standard errors for the three 
multilevel models conducted on positivity, calmness and shame ratings of 
recalled memories. 
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 Negative–Positive  Anxious-Calm  Shame-Pride 
Effect β SE p  β SE p  β SE p 
β0 3.691 0.635   3.264 0.425   1.837 0.669  
Social Anxiety –1.331 0.637 .018  –0.928 0.425 .014  1.934 1.035 .031 
Negative PEP –0.477 0.651 .232  –0.564 0.431 .095  0.274 0.543 .307 
Positive PEP –0.961 0.660 .073  –0.400 0.445 .184  –0.013 0.555 .491 
PEP –0.024 0.011 .015  –0.031 0.007 .000  0.003 0.013 .409 
Mood Change 0.007 0.006 .122  0.003 0.003 .159  0.005 0.005 .159 
Social Anxiety × Negative PEP 0.239 0.909 .396  1.325 0.611 .015  –0.200 0.772 .398 
Social Anxiety × Positive PEP 0.094 0.949 .461  0.244 0.623 .348  –0.626 0.785 .213 
Social Anxiety × PEP         –0.050 0.019 .004 
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FIGURES 
 Figure 1: Graph to show the mean positivity, anxiety and shame ratings of 
memories generated after positive or negative post-event processing, or a 
distraction task in low- and high socially anxious participants (low score = 
more negative, more anxious, or more shameful rating respectively). 
 Figure 2: Distribution of memories across PEP scores in socially anxious and 
non-anxious individuals (a random jitter was applied to the shame ratings so 
that all points could be seen, the jitter is just the shame score with a uniformly 
distributed random number between ± 0.25 added). A low score represents a 
more shameful memory. 
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